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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issue to be decided is whether a number of houses 
and fence lines were erroneously placed based on one or more 
mistaken surveys, establish or become the basis for boundary by 
acquiescence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Some of the statements made by appellants are not quite 
accurate and therefore need to be stated correctly or amplified 
in order to give this Court a proper understanding of the case. 
The lawsuit brought by respondent Staker was not only 
against the Ainsworths and the Holmes, but also against the 
Yokums and the Shanes. Because of some confusion in land 
ownership, the Shanes were initially identified as John Does 1 
and 2 but the property belonging to the Shanes was always the 
subject of respondent Staker's lawsuit from the beginning. A 
separate action was begun by respondents Ainsworth against 
appellant Maxfield. 
The two cases were combined on the motion of 
respondents Ainsworth in January of 1986. The attempt was to 
have all of the property boundary lines in the entire area 
resolved at once and in one hearing. Appellant Maxfield attended 
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the hearing on the motion to consolidate and even noticed up the 
hearing himself. 
The affidavits on file and the County Recorder's 
records reflect that from the time of the original patent to the 
present, the Holmes' property was held by parties different from 
those who are in the chain of title to the Staker property. R. 
at 74-75, 120-121. The records also reflect that physical 
boundaries between the Staker and the Holmes' properties were set 
at least at the turn of the century. Id. That is particularly 
true of the home built initially on the Holmes' property and now 
the residence of the Shanes. Id. Howeverr according to what now 
appears to be a correct survey, the record property boundary runs 
through the middle of the Shane house. R. at 116-117. 
Each of the parcels in question in this case have the 
following consistent characteristics: 
1. All of the fence lines in question in these 
combined cases (consisting of six separate east-west fences), are 
each approximately the same distance from the record boundary 
based on the current survey. 
2. The fence lines in question have been in existence 
since the early 20's if not before. See, e.g., R. at 74-75, 120-
121, 138-140, 190-192. 
3. There has been at least one survey of the 
properties in question which was taken in the early 20's, which 
survey now appear to be erroneous based on what appears to be the 
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use by that surveyors of an incorrect starting point, R. at 163-
165. 
4. None of the parties to this action nor their 
predesessors in interest have used any land beyond their fences. 
See, e.g., R. at 138-140. 
Up to the time of the sale to appellant Utah National 
of the appellants' property in question, apparently everyone in 
the general area treated the fence lines as the proper boundaries 
between properties. Upon appellant Utah National's purchase in 
197 2 of their property in dispute, appellant Utah National had 
the former owner quit claim to it that property between the fence 
line on the south of appellants' property and the boundary line 
according to a recent survey. R. at 113-115. That is the 
property which the Ainsworths have claimed over the years because 
it is within their fenced boundary* See, e.g., R. at 93-94. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent Staker in his motion for summary judgment 
asked the lower court for a determination that either the 
surveyed boundary lines or the fence lines were the true 
boundaries to his property, believing and arguing, however, that 
the fence lines were the more appropriate boundary of the two. 
Now that the lower court has found in favor of the fence lines, 
respondent Staker believes that that decision should be supported 
due not only to the long existence of the boundaries between 
Staker and his neighbors on both the north and the south, but 
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also due to the pattern of fences which have been established 
throughout this area as evidenced by the claims of other parties 
to this litigation. With that pattern existing due to at least 
one, if not more, erroneous surveys performed many years ago when 
surveying in rural areas was primitive at best, it now appears 
that the burden is on appellants to establish that there is no 
objective uncertainty by which the fence lines in question were 
established. Appellants have not only not met this burden, they 
have not even attempted to meet this burden. Therefore, the 
judgment of the lower court should be sustained. 
ARGUMENT 
Despite the advice in Robert Frost's poem "Mending 
Wall" that good fences make good neighbors, Frost also said, 
"Something there is that doesn't love a wall." In this case, out 
of all of the parties to this action, only appellants do not love 
a wall. When appellants acquired their property, it is obvious 
that they had had the benefit of a recent survey which reflected 
that between the fence on the south of their parcel and the south 
survey boundary line, there was a gap of some 75 feet. 
None of the material facts behind that purchase were 
before the lower court except for the fact that the parcel 
appellants are claiming in this action was quit claimed to them. 
The fact that there was a quit claim instead of a warranty deed 
to that 75+ foot strip, however, tells the whole story. 
Appellants knew that in order to secure the strip for their use, 
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there would have to be the kind of lawsuit in which the parties 
are presently engaged. But at no time have appellants actually 
tried to use the strip of land which they are now claiming. 
For the Ainsworths and Staker, if the current survey 
line is to be the true boundary line, then they both pick up 
property to the south while losing property on the north* If the 
fence lines are the true boundary, then the reverse is true. In 
either case, the total amount of their acreage remains almost 
exactly the same. Under the former scenario, the losers are the 
Holmes', the Shanes' and the Yokums'. The Holmes' and their 
predesessors in interest have been using their land up to the 
fence line for many years. (R. at 118-121.) The Shanes' house, 
which they recently purchased from the Holmes, would be divided 
in half by the survey boundary line. For the Yokums, the shift 
in the boundary line means they would totally lose their house. 
(See diagram below). If the fence lines are the boundary, the 
only losers are the appellants who lose a strip of land they have 
never used and to which they hold title by quit claim. 
5 
SUKCJ^ - ^ 
This does not mean that this case should be decided 
solely on the basis of equities, although on that basis there is 
no question that the lower court was correct. However, what it 
does say is that this case is more than just a dispute between 
appellants and the Ainsworths. It calls for a readjustment of 
large parcels of land and brings about a transfer of usage of 
some 6 or 7 acres of land. 
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POINT I 
THE ERRONEOUS SURVEYS CONSTITUTE THE OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
There is no dispute that with the recent boundary by 
acquiescence cases, (Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984); 
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Parsons v. 
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984)) this Court has redefined the 
tests for determining if a particular fence line constitutes the 
boundary between two parcels of ground. In those series of 
cases, this Court has indicated that there is a necessity of 
establishing objective uncertainty which the fence line or other 
visible marker was meant to resolve. (Two of the cases, however, 
did not actually turn on that issue. In Halladav/ this Court 
found that the parties claiming boundary by acquiescence actually 
knew of the true boundaries during the period necessary for 
acquiescence. In Parsons, there was no showing that there was 
mutual acquiescence for the requisite minimum of 20 years.) The 
obvious purpose of this test is to supply the legal substitute 
for a written agreement between adjoining landowners that a fence 
or other visible monument serves as the boundary between them. 
This development in the law is to guard against a claim of 
ownership based solely on the fact that one property owner does 
not object for some time to his neighbor using his property. 
This Court in its line of decisions has indicated that 
a survey is the best measure by which a true boundary is to be 
determined. Thus in cities or well developed areas, it will be 
difficult for anyone to claim land not actually covered by deed 
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or written agreement. This changes, however, when the property 
is located in a rural or farming area. See Halladav v. Cluff at 
p. 501, Fn. 6. For farmland, adhering to established fence lines 
might be the very best way of promoting "repose of title and 
stability in boundaries." Id. at 505. Further, if the parties 
relied on a survey which was in error, "that is a clear instance 
of objective uncertainty." Id. at 508, Fn. 7. 
It is clear from Halladav that if owners of farm land 
in fact build a fence based on a survey, that would be the very 
best that they could do under the circumstances. Their reliance 
on a fence (even based on an incorrectly surveyed boundary line) 
would in fact constitute the true boundary between the parties if 
the parties accepted it as such for a long time. That is exactly 
what happened here. There is no question, as shown from the 
various affidavits, that the fences in question were set 
according to one or more very early surveys and that said 
survey(s) were erroneous. There was thus no reasonable basis for 
those who built houses and fenced farm lands in this area to deal 
with this matter than other than as they did. 
The fact that there now appears to be a correct survey 
which cuts the Shanes' home in half and which totally precludes 
the Yokums from using their house does not change what happened 
before. If, as appellants contend, fence lines established 
pursuant to an erroneous survey and acknowledged for at least 50 
years by the property owners on both sides to be the dividing 
line between the properties do not establish the legal boundary, 
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it is submitted that virtually every rural fence in the State of 
Utah is in doubt. A fence line in a rural area would always be 
subject to the most recent survey, forcing property lines to 
shift in accordance with a new survey. That is particularly true 
since there are many fences in the State of Utah which were 
established by well-meaning surveyors who, because of their 
primitive methods, were off on their surveys. 
As a further anomaly, this Court has previously bound a 
seller to a representation that it was selling all of the land 
within two fence lines, even though the precise legal description 
found in the written contract did not include all of that land. 
Nevertheless, this Court required the seller to perform based on 
fence lines and not on the legal description. See Jensen v. 
Manila Corporation, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1977). 
POINT II 
THE APPEAL IS OF THE ENTIRE DECISION OF THE COURT 
Appellants have tried to make the claim that their only 
argument is with respondents Ainsworth and that they have no 
dispute with the remainder of the parties. However, their notice 
of appeal does not make that limitation. It appeals the entire 
decision made below. 
As can be seen from the Record at pages 252-253, 
respondent Staker has taken the position that either the fence 
line or the survey boundary lines should prevail, but that there 
should be consistency in the court's decision. The court below 
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found for the fence lines and Staker agreed with that position as 
being the better result. If this Court, however, were to find 
for appellants, then respondents Ainsworth would have the right 
to ask that that same ruling apply to their southern boundary 
which would then take some 75 feet from respondent Staker's 
property. Staker would then in turn have the right to ask the 
same from respondents Jensen, Shane and Yokum. 
As was clearly enunciated in a recent decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, which interestingly enough, was a follow-
on case to the Halladay v. Cluff case decided by this Court, that 
court affirmed the position that a party satisfied with the 
results of the district court need not cross appeal. In fact "a 
cross-appeal would not have been appropriate." Halladay v. 
Cluff, 739 P. 2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1987). To so cross-appeal 
would be to take a position inconsistent with the position with 
which the party agreed. It would only be if this Court reverses 
the lower court decision that respondents have any need for 
taking further action. 
Thus, it is clear that the appellants by their action 
are in fact seeking to overturn the decision of the lower court 
with regard to all of the fence lines involved in the lower 
court's decision. Hence any decision with regard to the boundary 
lines would be applicable to all parcels. 
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POINT III 
THE CONSISTENCY OF THE FENCE LINE SHOWS THAT THEY WERE PLACED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH A SURVEY. 
Appellant suggests that the reason why fences were 
placed where they were is uncertain and unknown. However, 
contrary to that argument are the following uncontroverted facts: 
1. The Holmes and their predecessors in interest have 
always regarded the fence line on their northern boundary to be 
their property boundary. R. at 73-74, 118-121. 
2. The Holmes' property has never been held by holders 
of the title to Staker's property at any time and vice versa. 
3. Each of the fences in question is approximately the 
same distance away from the current survey line, or in other 
words, around 75 feet. See the diagram on p.8 of this Brief. 
4. There are survey markers in line with certain of 
the fences. R. at 195. 
The foregoing suggests that the property owners in this 
rural area established their fence lines precisely on those 
boundaries that they thought separated each other's property. 
The fact that each one of them is consistent with the other in 
distance away from what is now being termed the correct survey 
line shows that there is indeed a definite pattern supporting the 
basis as to the placement of the fences in accordance with one or 
more earlier surveys. Naturally enough, the remoteness in time 
of the occurrence of the placement of the fences makes it 
difficult for any party to give exact information as to why the 
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fences were established where they now stand. However, 
respondent Staker submits that this is another basis for 
believing that this enormous length of time of acceptance of the 
fence line adds credence to the claim. The properties have 
traded hands over the years and there has been no thought other 
than that the fence lines were the boundary throughout. 
POINT IV 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON APPELLANTS 
The Halladav case suggests (contrary to appellants' 
contention) that the burden of proof is on appellants in this 
case. Certainly that decision makes clear that the burden of 
proof enunciated in that case was specifically limited to that 
case and to those facts. Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500, 507 
(Utah 1984). This Court's decision in Halladav strongly suggests 
that the burden of proof in the instant case is allocated to 
appellants because of the overwhelming pattern of fences in 
relation to present survey lines in the whole area. It is not 
one isolated case of a dispute between two neighbors. Therefore, 
appellants should have the burden of proof of showing that there 
was no objective uncertainty. And they have not met that burden. 
Certainly, the history of the early settlers of this 
State should suffice to note that if a man did not own a piece of 
property, and particularly 75 feet or so of it some 1,000 feet 
long, he did not fence it in and use it. Moreover, it is also 
well known that canals and ditches were constructed along 
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boundaries and often themselves constituted the boundary between 
parties as opposed to a fence. Therefore, considering the record 
ownership of the properties under the circumstances, it is more 
natural to assume that the construction of ditches and canals 
came after the establishment of fences as the boundary. 
According to appellants7 theory, there is no such thing 
as an incorrect survey on which one could base objective 
uncertainty because one can always have a correct survey. There 
is no question, for example, that the monument at the corner of 
South Temple and Main Street in Salt Lake City, which establishes 
the beginning point for all surveys in the state was in existence 
in 1856. R. at 164. Therefore, according to the appellants' 
argument, one could easily begin a survey from that Base and 
Meridian and survey correctly the land in question, even though 
it is located some 100 blocks south of that monument. But of 
course, that argument is not supported by any of the cases. Nor 
does even the fact that a good surveyor with modern equipment 
could have made a correct survey of the property in question from 
even a closer monument. The test, repeated over and over again 
in Halladay, is a "reasonably available" survey. The most 
reasonably available survey which anyone can name prior to the 
recent past is that of Mr. Rock, and that survey appears to have 
been wrong. R. at 163-165, 194. 
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POINT V 
THERE IS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT WHICH REQUIRES FURTHER TRIAL 
At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked the 
parties to declare by the end of the hearing whether there 
remained any factual disputes. (R. at 240.) Then after all the 
arguments had concluded, the court asked the parties to submit 
all additional matters by way of affidavit. (R. at 313-314, 319.) 
In response, some parties filed additional affidavits, namely one 
was filed on behalf of appellants and one was filed on behalf of 
respondents Ainsworth. With those additions, there is every 
indication from the parties that all materials necessary to 
decide this case were before the court. In fact, the court 
stated specifically: "[W]hat I gleam from you gentlemen*... is 
that there is no more factual matters and you want me to rule on 
it as a matter of law." R. at 319. 
It is interesting that appellants should complain of 
materials submitted by affidavit from the respondents and yet, as 
part of their argument, rely on the affidavit of appellant 
Maxfield for the truthfulness of what one of the surveyors whose 
affidavit is before the court allegedly told Mr. Maxfield in a 
private conversation with no other parties present. R. at 169. 
Appellants do not present that supposed contradictory statement 
by way of affidavit from the surveyor himself and certainly the 
surveyor is no party to this action. Therefore, this Court can 
rightfully reject such portions of the various affidavits as is 
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appropriate, such as that extremely heresay material from 
Maxfield. 
Taking only those portions of the various affidavits 
which are proper for the purposes of summary judgment, however, 
there still are really no material factual issues in this case. 
For the purpose of ordering summary judgment in favor of the 
fence lines as the boundaries between the various parcels, the 
lower court had all it needed. What more would a trial of the 
issues bring to bear on the subject? Certainly, it is doubtful 
that there could be any better information concerning exactly the 
methods and practices of Mr. Rock, the surveyor in the 1920's. 
Although not so stated, it appears that Mr. Rock is deceased. 
Certainly no one can seem to give any indication of his 
whereabouts. Nor are his records apparently extant (which is in 
keeping with his reputation of not being a very careful 
surveyor). R. at 165, 194. 
It should be further apparent that there are no living 
witnesses to indicate the basis upon which either the Shane home 
or the Yokum home were built except to repeat the statements 
found in the affidavit of Melvin Lancaster, Teeples and others 
that everyone treated the fences as the boundaries. R. at 74-75, 
118-121, 138-140. The fact that the home now occupied by the 
Shanes' appears to have been built prior to the Rock survey in 
the 1920 's does not by itself elicit any testimony as to the 
exact basis upon which the home was built, i.e., why it was built 
on what appellants claim to be the property line. However, there 
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is no indication that there is any extant testimony that would 
better explain that matter. 
In short, it is the nature of these kinds of cases that 
there is, in fact, many aspects of testimony which are missing 
and which have led the courts to adopt the theory of boundary by 
acquiescence to substitute, legally, for matters which cannot be 
determined, one way or another, out of the past. In fact, one of 
the major prerequisites for boundary by acquiescence is that the 
boundaries have existed for a long time. Thus, there is no basis 
for this Court to return this case for trial since there is no 
indication that at a trial of this matter any further critical 
and material facts would be established. 
POINT VI 
THIS COURT HAS NOT ABANDONED BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
A recent law review article seems to imply that this 
Court has totally abandoned boundary by acquiescence and has done 
so by reason of confusion between the requirements for boundary 
by contract and boundary by acquiescence. See Backman, ''The Law 
of Practical Location of Boundaries and the* Need for an Adverse 
Possession Remedy" 1986 BYU Law Review 957,966. Even Justice 
Howe has expressed that concern. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 
360, 366 (Utah 1984). But despite that concern, there is basis 
left for the courts to find boundary by acquiescence and this is 
such a case. However, if appellants are right, then perhaps 
Justice Howe is correct that "the death knell" has sounded. Id. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
This Court in numerous decisions as well as other 
courts and other jurisdictions faced with the same problem have 
constantly held it to be a significant goal in the law to avoid 
litigation relating to boundaries and to encourage neighbors to 
be neighborly. The fence lines in this particular case 
have been long respected by the various neighbors as being the 
boundary lines. Even when surveys in 1956 and again in the 
1970 's revealed differences between the legal description and the 
fence lines, no one bothered to contest the placement of the 
fences. Even respondent Staker, in initiating this action, did 
not elect to have his boundary set according to the survey line. 
Rather, the suit was started in the alternative with the 
preference stated in favor of the fences. On the other hand, 
when appellants acquired their land and learned that there was 
some 75 feet beyond their fence line which might conceivably be 
available to them, they acquired a quit claim deed to that strip. 
They then simply waited for the day when they could claim that 
strip even though during that entire period of time, they never 
used it or attempted to use it. It is submitted that the 
doctorine of boundary by acquiescence is not dead. Even applying 
the strongest language found in Halladay and the follow-on cases, 
there still exists boundary by acquiescence in this case. The 
lower court decision should be sustained. 
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Respectfully submitted this A f day of September, 
1987. 
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